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ARGUMENTS
Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust was terminated pursuant to his own actions
and representations. Even if his beneficial interest was not terminated, however, Tracy is
not entitled to claim an interest in pre-Complaint distributions or to assert that Phillip
breached his fiduciary duties since Phillip acted pursuant to the directive given to Phillip
by the Decree of Divorce issued by Judge Gunnell on November 4, 1991 and to the
express, written directions of Tracy himself.
I.

TRACY TERMINATED HIS STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE
TRUST.
Tracy terminated his interest in the Trust by either (a) executing a Waiver and

Assignment that substantially complied with Utah's Disclaimer Statute; (b) waiving his
beneficial interest in the Trust; or (c) agreeing to a mutual modification of the Trust.
A.

Substantial Compliance with Utah's Disclaimer Statute.
Tracy does not dispute that his Wavier and Assignment strictly complied with the

first three provisions of the Disclaimer Statute in effect when Tracy signed the Waiver
and Assignment. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 7-8. Tracy also does not dispute that his
Waiver and Assignment substantially complied with the fourth and final provision of the
relevant version of the Disclaimer Statute. See id. Instead, Tracy asserts that all four
provisions of the 1991 version of the Disclaimer Statute require strict compliance to
effectuate a valid disclaimer. See id.
However, the sole basis cited by Tracy in support of his assertion is an out-ofcontext statement taken from a case dealing with the failure of a beneficiary to even
1

substantially comply with an amended version of the disclaimer statute. See id. In
Faulkner, the beneficiary of a trust "accepted various items from the trust, including
television equipment and household items, a kiln, and an opal ring." Whitney v.
Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, If 3, 95 P.3d 270. After accepting these items from the trust, the
beneficiary executed a document entitled "Renunciation of Interest" purporting to
"renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all [his] right, title, interest, or claim as a
beneficiary of the [trust]." Id. atffl[3-6 (emphasis added).
Although the disclaimer statute in force at that time provided for partial
disclaimers, it also provided that "[t]he right to disclaim property or an interest therein is
barred by an acceptance of the property or interest or a benefit under it." Id. at f 12
(quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-80 l(5)(c) (Supp. 2003)). Based upon these facts and
law, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he disclaimer was ineffective as a total
disclaimer because he accepted property from the trust, and as a partial disclaimer
because it did not accurately describe the interest to be disclaimed." Id. at f 14.
In addressing the beneficiary's substantial compliance argument, the court found
that "by accepting property from the trust, he failed to comply with the third provision"
of the disclaimer statute, which the court described as "the acceptance of no benefit from
the interest sought to be disclaimed." Id. at f 13. Consequently "[his] compliance with
the statute [did] not depend on whether he substantially complied with the partial
disclaimer provisions." Id.

2

Accordingly, the court found that not only had the beneficiary failed to strictly
comply with the applicable statutory provision; he also failed to even substantially
comply with the statutory provision. As a result, the court noted that "[the beneficiary's]
substantial compliance argument simply ignores both the language of the statute and
of the document he executed." Id. at ^ 14. This is the statement taken out of context by
Tracy in arguing that "Phillip's position was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court." See
Tracy's Reply Brief at 7. According to Tracy, "[t]he Utah Supreme Court stated that
'substantial compliance' with this disclaimer statute, rather than strict compliance,
"simply ignores both the language of the statute and of the document...'" See id.
Putting the statement back in context, however, reveals that the court was not
making an across-the-board statement that strict compliance was required of all of the
provisions of the disclaimer statute. The court was clearly rejecting the substantial
compliance argument made by that particular beneficiary in that particular case since the
beneficiary did not even substantially comply with a provision of the relevant disclaimer
statute. Given that the beneficiary failed to even substantially comply with the statutory
provision, it was not necessary for the court to determine whether substantial compliance
was sufficient to satisfy the provision or whether strict compliance was required.
Furthermore, Faulkner involved an amended version of the disclaimer statute.
The version of the Disclaimer Statute in effect when Tracy signed the Waiver and
Assignment provides in relevant part, "[t]he disclaimer shall: £i) describe the property or
interest in it disclaimed; {ii) declare the disclaimer and extent of it; j[iii} be signed by the
3

disclaimant; and j(iv} state that the disclaimer is proper under Subsection (4), and was
made within the required time limits." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(l)(b) (1991)
(emphasis added). In contrast, the version of the disclaimer statute at issue in Faulkner
provided, "[t]he disclaimer shall: £a} describe the property or interest disclaimed; fb)
declare the disclaimer and extent thereof; and {c} be signed by the disclaimant." See
Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, \ 9, 95 P.3d 270; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-801(3) (Supp. 2003)
(emphasis added).
Accordingly, the fourth provision of the 1991 version of the Disclaimer Statute—
the only provision with which Tracy's Wavier and Assignment did not strictly comply—
was no longer included in the statute when Faulkner was decided by the Utah Supreme
Court. Consequently, it cannot be argued that the Utah Supreme Court ruled on whether
a valid disclaimer could be effectuated pursuant to the 1991 version of the Disclaimer
Statute based upon strict compliance with its first three provisions and substantial
compliance with its fourth provision: the fourth provision simply was not at issue.
In this case, Tracy does not dispute that his Wavier and Assignment strictly
complied with the first three provisions of the applicable version of the Disclaimer
Statute and substantially complied with its fourth and final provision. For the reasons set
forth in Phillip's Opening Brief and herein, this Court should find that Tracy's status as a
beneficiary of the Trust ceased when Phillip accepted the Waiver and Assignment into
the Trust and reverse the trial court's conclusion to the contrary.

4

B.

Waiver.
Utah Code § 75-2-802 (1991) provides a means whereby an individual can

terminate his or her interest in a testamentary transfer of property. However, it does not
contain any language indicating that compliance with its provisions is the only way to
terminate an interest in a testamentary transfer. In fact, subsection (5) expressly provides,
"[t]his section does not abridge the right of persons to waive, release, assign, convey,
disclaim, or renounce property or an interest in it under any other statute." UTAH CODE
ANN. §75-2-802(5) (1991).
Although Tracy argues that subsection (5) was only intended to limit the
application of the Disclaimer Statute to testamentary dispositions, an interpretation of
subsection (5) to that effect ignores its plain language and would render it meaningless
since subsection (l)(a) already addresses the extent to which the Disclaimer Statute is
applicable to property dispositions. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 8; UTAH CODE ANN. §
75-2-802(5) (1991) ("A person . . . who is a . .. beneficiary under a nontestamentary
instrument or contract... may disclaim in whole or in part the right of transfer to the
person of any property or interest in it by delivering or filing a written disclaimer under
this section.").1

1

In any event, whether the Disclaimer Statute is applicable to other property dispositions
in addition to those of a testamentary nature is irrelevant to whether another statute
provides a means whereby individuals can rid themselves of testamentary dispositions.
5

Tracy's unsupported assertion that subsection (5) is "introductory language" that
only "applies to transfers and dispositions other than [testamentary dispositions]" is
similarly without merit. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 8. As an initial matter, subsection (5)
cannot be trivialized as "introductory language." It follows provisions describing a
means of disclaiming a testamentary disposition and is clearly intended to be substantive.
"When examining the statutory language we assume the legislature used each term
advisedly." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 8, 52 P.3d 1276. Consequently, "effect
must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute." State v.
Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1f 53, 63 P.3d 621.
Furthermore, while the language of subsection (5) certainly applies to transfers
and dispositions of property other than testamentary dispositions, there is simply nothing
in subsection (5) or any other subsection of the Disclaimer Statute purporting to elevate
the Disclaimer Statute into a position of being the only means whereby individuals can
rid themselves of testamentary dispositions. Contrary to Tracy's assertion, allowing an
interest in a testamentary disposition to be waived pursuant to the principals of equity, as
codified in Utah Code § 75-7-106, does not render the Disclaimer Statute meaningless.
"The usual effect of the disclaimer statute is to avoid the imposition of transfer
taxes and to thwart creditors." Whitney v. Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, \ 14, 95 P.3d 270. It
makes sense that the legislature would provide a statutory means of disclaiming an
interest in a testamentary disposition by which an individual can be assured that he or she

6

will not be subject to transfer taxes and the disclaimed interest will not be subject to the
claims of creditors.
It also makes sense for the legislature to provide an alternative means of riding
oneself of an interest in a testamentary disposition for those not concerned with avoiding
transfer taxes or thwarting creditors.2 Why not allow "persons to waive, release, assign,
convey, disclaim, or renounce" an interest in a testamentary disposition pursuant to
compliance with the terms of another statute if avoiding transfer taxes and thwarting
creditors is not the goal? See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(5) (1991).3
The Utah Supreme Court recently observed, "[t]he mere fact that the legislature
may have provided an avenue of relief for a particular injury does not preclude alternative
methods of recovery for that same, or a similar, injury absent some evidence that the
legislature intended that its statutory remedy be the sole avenue of relief." Ashby v.
Ashby, 2010 UT 7, T| 25, 227 P.3d 246. Just as the legislature does not render an avenue
2

There are numerous reasons one may desire to disclaim or refuse an interest in a trust
other than to thwart creditors or avoid transfer taxes. These include complying with the
wishes of a settlor (particularly if the settlor is a parent or other close relative), avoiding
involvement in an anticipated lawsuit over the assets, not needing the interest and/or
desiring that someone else receive it or benefit from it.
3

This also applies to Phillip's substantial compliance argument. It seems that if strict
compliance is the standard, it should only apply to those transfers intended to avoid
creditors and/or transfer taxes, both of which affect the rights of third parties, e.g.
creditors and the government. In the present case, however, Tracy's waiver or disclaimer
carried no such purpose or effect. Accordingly, requiring strict compliance in this case is
only an exercise in raising form over substance in order to prop up the purpose or policy
behind the statute, which, in the end, has no application to this case.
7

of relief for a particular injury meaningless by not making it the sole avenue of relief, the
legislature did not render the Disclaimer Statute meaningless by allowing individuals to
rid themselves of a beneficial interest in a testamentary disposition by effectuating a
waiver, release, assignment, conveyance, disclaimer, or renunciation pursuant to
compliance with another statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(5) (1991).
In fact, it is not uncommon for the legislature to provide alternative means of
accomplishing the same result. See, e.g., Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7, f 25,227 P.3d 246;
Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57,fflf11-13, 52 P.3d 1148 (describing two
"alternative" statutory methods to effectuate an annexation); Cole v. Jordan School Dist.,
899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1995) ("The legislature amended section 63-30-11 to provide
minors with an alternative to filing a notice of claim within one year...."); City
Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 1991) ("In 1961, the Utah
legislature enacted the Utah Trust Deed Act, which provided an alternative to the
mortgage foreclosure process.55); State v. Judd, 493 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah 1972) ("The
legislature has acknowledged the unique circumstances of the mother or pregnant woman
and offered her two alternative remedies.55); Hess v. Udy, 185 P. 367, 368 (Utah 1919)
(noting "the wisdom of the Legislature in providing an efficient alternative remedy that
can be resorted to at the option of the party injured55).
Providing alternative means of accomplishing the same result does not render one
of the means meaningless, especially when, like those seeking to rid themselves of a
testamentary disposition, the result may be sought for differing reasons. In this case,
8

Tracy waived his beneficial interest in the Trust either when he signed the Waiver and
Assignment or when he drafted and sent the letters to Phillip and Robert. With respect to
the letters to Phillip and Robert, Tracy argues that the inclusion of certain language in the
letters regarding whether he signed the Waiver and Assignment evidences that Tracy did
not intend to relinquish his interest in the Trust by drafting and sending the letters. See
Tracy's Reply Brief at 8. However, a thorough examination of the letters clearly
evidences that Tracy was attempting both to waive his interest in the Trust and cast doubt
on whether he signed the Wavier and Assignment. In his letter to Phillip, Tracy wrote the
following:
No, I'm not going to do anything about that Estate. It's not worth it to me. I'm
not that small of a person.
So, I guess the two of you can do what you want.
You did say that I signed some paper. I don't remember if I did or didn't

I have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody else, for that
matter would intentionally and knowingly sign away there [sic] inheritance? No,
and neither would you.

Like I said, I'm not going to do anything about the estate.
See Letter from Tracy to Phillip; Addendum Exhibit "E". Similarly, Tracy wrote to
Robert the following:
First of all, I'm not going to do anything about the estate. I'm not that small of a
person, so I guess the two of you can do what you want.
9

I don't remember whether I signed anything or not
Do you think I would
intentionally sign away my inheritance? Would you? I don't know of anybody
that would.
See Letter from Tracy to Robert; Addendum Exhibit "F".
Each letter begins with a statement of Tracy's intent to waive his beneficial
interest in the Trust. Tracy then mentions the Wavier and Assignment, states that he does
not remember whether he signed it, and then poses a rhetorical question to convince
Phillip and Robert that he did not sign the Waiver and Assignment.
This attempt to convince Phillip and Robert that he did not sign the Waiver and
Assignment, however, does not constitute a revocation of his contemporaneous waiver of
his beneficial interest in the Trust. In fact, after posing the rhetorical question casting
doubt on whether he signed the Wavier and Assignment, Tracy confirmed his intent to
waive his interest in the Trust at the end of his letter to Phillip when he stated, "Like I
said, I'm not going to do anything about the estate." See Letter from Tracy to Phillip;
Addendum Exhibit "E".
As a result, Tracy waived both his beneficial interest in the Trust and the claims he
is now asserting against Phillip for breaching his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy either
when he signed the Wavier and Assignment or when he signed and sent the letters to
Phillip and Robert.

10

C.

Mutual Modification of the Trust
Tracy correctly points out that a trust may be modified or revoked solely by the

settlors of the trust if the power to do so is reserved by the terms of the trust. See Tracy's
Reply Brief at 9. Tracy also correctly points out that in this case the power of the settlors,
Don and Barbara Southwick (hereinafter "Don and Barbara"), to unilaterally modify the
Trust was not reserved in the Trust Agreement. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 9-10;
Addendum Exhibit "E". However, these points are irrelevant since Phillip's argument is
that the Trust was mutually modified by the settlors and all of the beneficiaries, not that it
was unilaterally modified by Don and Barbara.
In addition to the power of the settlors to unilaterally modify or revoke a trust
when that power is reserved by the trust instrument, "[a] noncharitable, irrevocable trust
may be modified or terminated upon consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries, even if
the modification or termination is inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-411 (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). This statute codified the
well-settled common law "that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust even though its
continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s)
consent to its termination." See Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 187 n.2 (Utah
1981); see also Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977) (a trust may be
terminated "where all the beneficiaries thereof consent").
The only argument advanced by Tracy to dispute that he was removed as a
beneficiary of the Trust pursuant to a mutual modification of the Trust by the settlors and
11

beneficiaries is that "the [Wavier and Assignment] is not a consent to any modification"
and the Joint Release "does not adversely affect any beneficiary other than Don." See
Tracy's Reply Brief at 9-11. However, these arguments ignore the plain language of the
Wavier and Assignment and the Joint Release.
By executing the Joint Release, Don and Barbara agreed "to convey and transfer
all of the assets located in [the Trust] to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole beneficiary
under the terms of [the Trust]." See Addendum Exhibit "C". In designating Barbara as
the sole beneficiary, Don and Barbara necessarily agreed for Tracy to no longer be a
beneficiary of the Trust.
By executing the Wavier and Assignment, Tracy agreed to "renounce[] any claim
he may have to any of the Trust." Tracy then directed the Trustee "to distribute [Tracy's]
share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK" as if to punctuate his
renunciation of his beneficial interest in the Trust. In renouncing his interest in the Trust,
Tracy clearly agreed to no longer be a beneficiary of the Trust.
Phillip affirmatively consented to the trust modification by accepting the Joint
Release and the Waiver and Assignment into the Trust. [R. 1066, 1068-69 (Findings of
Fact 1fl[ 12,13, 17)]. Robert testified that he also affirmatively consented to the trust
modification. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 273-274)]. Since everyone associated with
the Trust affirmatively manifested consent to divest Tracy of his beneficial interest in the
Trust, the Trust was modified by mutual consent and Tracy ceased thereafter to be a
beneficiary of the Trust.
12

it

AFFIRMATION ON OTHER GROVNDS.
The ability of the public to rely on judicial decrees is a fundamental principal of

justice. Likewise, it would be manifestly unfair to subject a third party to liability for
acting in accordance with a court order just because it was subsequently found to be
flawed. "To [hold that a party cannot rely on a court order] would hi to . . . condemn
parties to the instability of guessing which orders to abide and which orders to ignore.
This will not do." In re Demos, 57 F.3d 1037, 1039 (11th Cir. 1995).
Indeed, "[a]s a matter of logic and equity, it seems that a party should be able to
rely upon orders of [the trial courts] without having to anticipate how those orders might
be modified by subsequent action of the Supreme Court." Matter ofHeizer Corp., 1989
WL 112547, *2 (Del. Ch. 1989) (unreported opinion). Accordingly, the courts have
repeatedly refused to penalize parties for conducting themselves consistently with an
order even when the court was not ultimately authorized to make the order.
In one case, for example, "the trial court entered an order extending the time for
filing the record." Murphy v. Dumas, 343 Ark. 608, 609 (Ark. 2001). Although the
Arkansas Supreme Court found that the "extension order was void and of no effect," it
declined to punish the party that had relied on the trial court's error:
[W]e are reluctant to dismiss an appeal when the appellants relied on an order of
the trial court, albeit an erroneous order, which gave them until January 29, 2001,
to file their record.. .. We have held in the past that parties are entitled to rely on
a trial court's order extending time even when the trial court may later vacate the
order or when a judgment was erroneously entered. This principal should apply to
the facts of this case.
Id. at 610 (internal citations omitted).
13

In this case, Tracy would have Phillip held liable for breaching a fiduciary duty to
Tracy by not treating Tracy as a Trust beneficiary. He argues that the Decree of Divorce
did not and could not amend the Trust or otherwise terminate Tracy's interest in the Trust
without Tracy's consent. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 12-15. However, these arguments
ignore the fact that the Decree of Divorce purported to do just that by directing "the
Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, to do whatever is necessary to . . . make Barbara P.
Southwick the sole beneficiary of the assets of the trust as her sole and separate
property." [R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 8); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum
Exhibit "B"].
To treat Tracy as a beneficiary would have been inconsistent with the Decree of
Divorce and the steps subsequently taken by the Southwicks, including Tracy,4 to comply
with the Decree of Divorce.5 Holding Phillip liable for complying in good faith with a
flawed court order would be unjust. Consequently, the trial court's judgment—that Tracy
4

It is interesting to note that Tracy also conducted himself in accordance with the Decree
of Divorce by signing the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact \
15); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. It is disingenuous for Tracy to
now argue that it was unreasonable for Phillip to rely on the Decree of Divorce, Don &
Barbara's Joint Release, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment, and Tracy's Letters.
5

If the Court finds that it was reasonable for Phillip to rely on the Decree of Divorce, it
must also find that it was reasonable for Phillip to comply with the request made by
Barbara for Phillip and Robert to maintain their status as beneficiaries of the Trust since
it would have been reasonable for Phillip to believe that Barbara was the sole owner of
the property and/or beneficiary of the Trust and could therefore do as she pleased with
the Trust and its assets. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 338 (1959); R. 1066, 1068
(Findings of Fact f 9).
14

is a beneficiary of the Trust but that he is not entitled to claim an interest in preComplaint distributions or to assert that Phillip breached his fiduciary duties—should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Phillip respectfully requests that the Court conclude
that Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the Trust was terminated by virtue of his execution
of the Waiver and Assignment and/or the letters Tracy sent to Phillip and Robert. In the
alternative, Phillip respectfully requests that the Court: (1) affirm the trial court's
conclusion that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty to Tracy; and (2) find that the trial
court's conclusion that Phillip suffered a detriment by relying on Tracy's statements was
supported by evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisZ^ay of September, 2010.
SMI i i IKNOWLK; ; r.c.

M

* \ 3 s p l i e f i F.Noel
Garrett A. Walker
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Phillip D. Southwick

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APELLANT, postage prepaid, to the
following this '2^ day of September, 2010:
Matthew G. Grimmer
Erin T. Middleton
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees

Legal Assistant
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit A

Trust Agreement

Exhibit B

Decree of Divorce—Don and Barbara

Exhibit C

Don and Barbara's Joint Release

Exhibit D

Tracy's Waiver and Assignment

Exhibit E

Letter from Tracy to Phillip

Exhibit F

Letter from Tracy to Robert
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Addendum Exhibit A

TRUST AGREEMENT
DON

B.

SOUTHWICK

and BARBARA P.

Tiemont Street, Tremonton,

Box Elder County,

referred to as the Trustors,
to

PHILLIP D.

84337,

referred

911

North

Utah, hereinafter

hereby transfer and assign in Trust

SOUTHWICK of 1150

hereinafter

SOUTHWICK of

S.

660

to as the

W. r

Tremonton,

Trustee,

the

Utah

property

described in Schedule "A,f attached hereto.
All
this

property now or hereafter subject to the provisions of.'

instrument

shall

be

held,

managed

and

distributed

as

hereinafter provided,
ARTICLE I
Distribution
1-

Lifetime

Trustors,

the

benefit,

such

of

Trustee

Trustors.

During the

shall-pay to

the

lifetime

Trustors,

of

for

tho
their

amounts from the principal or income of I he Trust

Estate as they shall from time to time direct.
2*
become
they

Incapacity of Trustors. In the event the Trusters slm.ll
physically

cannot

shall
income

pay

or mentally incapacitated to an

conveniently attend to their own
to them or apply for their benefit,

extent

affairs,
such

tint

Trusts

sums

from

or principal as he shall determine in his sole '1 i.scral:.KMi

is necessary or desirable to provide for Trustors1 care, support,
and maintenance.
3.

Death of Trustors. Upon the death of the Trustors, Urn

rrustee shall pay out of the income and/or principal of the Tr«i*:i:

Estate

the

Trustors

expenses

of the last illness

and

\hn

funeral, of:

and any debts of the Trustors to the extent that otli'M

provisions

shall

not

have been made for the

payment

of su<:h

expenses or debts.
4«

Distribution After Payment of Debts»

the Trustors,
illness

and

Upon the death of:

the Trustee, after payment of all expenses of last
funeral

Trustors,

shall

including

income

accounts,

and

Trustors1

sons,

Tremonton, Utah

of

the

distribute
and/or

all

Trustors and
the

balance of

principal,

all

proceeds from life

PHILLIP

D.

any

debts

the

cash

of

Trust

1150

tho

Estnln

including

insurance

SOUTHWICK

of

bmil:

policies
S.

6G0

to
W.,

84-337, ROBERT S. MILNER of 810 Cottonwood Drive,

South Weber*, Utah 84405,

and TRACY L.

SOUTHWICK of 150 Jcr'-my'

Street,.Salt Lake City, Utah*
In

the event Trustors1 said children should predecease

Trustors or die prior tp the distribution of the Tru.^t
leaving

issue

surviving them,

f

propoi'v,

their share in the Trust

R.nim-

shall go to their lawful issue by right of representation.

ARTICLE II
Rights Reserved by Trustors
!•
Trustors,

Neither

the

may alter,

Trustors

or

any

person

on

behalf.

amend or revoke this Trust in whole cu

part •during the lifetime of the Trustors,

IK*

during Incompetency

the Trustorsf or after the death 'of the Trustors*

PS000002

2.
to

Adding to Trust.

The Trustors at any time, or from, tim^

time, or by testamentary disposition may add to

this TniM:

other property which, when accepted by the Trustee, shall become
a

part of the Trust Estate to be held in trust under

the

temw

and provisions of this Agreement.
3.

Restrictions

on

Sale and

Reinvestment.

l.uirJng Hi"

lifetime of the Trustors, the Trustee shall make no saJe or ol-Indisposition
investment
shall

any

property of the Trust Estate

and

make tin

of any money held in the said Ttust Estate except nr*

be

however,

of

designated
that

in writing

by

the

Trustors.

Fiovid'Hl,

in the event of the incompetency of the Trustors,

this paragraph shall not apply and the Trustee shall exercise lus
discretion without the written consent of the Trustors.
ARTICLE III
Powers of the Trustee
To

carry out the purposes of this Trust and subject to any

limitations

stated

elsewhere in this

instrument,

the .Trustor*

shall have all the powers presently granted to Trustees under thn
provisions
powers

of Utah Code Annotated 75-7-402,

hereafter

in addition to any

conferred by law and including

the

following

powers 1
1only
in

Limitation on Investments.

To invest the Trust Entat9

in secured savings accounts and/or'certificates of

deposit

banks or savings and loan associations in which tiic deposits

are insured by the Federal Goverrmient unless otherwise authorized
by the Trustors.
PS000003

2,

Payment of Expenses»

To pay taxes, assessments and all

.other expenses incurred in the administration of the Trur*t Estate
and

the

protection thereof against legal or

including

equitable

attack,

counsel fees and reasonable compensation for

his own

services,
3.
What

Determination

is

To

determine

principal and income of the Trust Estate and

apportion

and allocate,
between

these

of Principal and Income,

in his discretion,
accounts

except

receipts and disbursements
insofar as

the

Trustee

as

shall

exercise the discretion herein conferred, and except as otherwjsc
provided
income

in this instrument,

nw.\

matters relating to principal

shall be governed by the provisions of the

Utah

Uhlfoim

Principal and Income Act from time to time existing.
M2. Bond

4«

hereunder,
for

the

No Trustee or successor

Trust*™,

shall be required to give any bond or other

soeuiity

faithful

Required*

performance

of

their

duties,

powers nn<!

discretions.
ARTICLE IV
General Provisions
1.
accrued
shall

Accrual

Expenses.

lii'yw

or unpaid on trust property when received in*o the Tiu.'-e
be treated as any other income.

undistributed
or

of Income and Proration of

estate

entitled

Income accrued

by the Trustee at the termination of any

under this Trust shall go to the
to

the next eventual interest in

or

intnrc-f-

beneficiaries
the

h"l«i

no::t

proportions

in

which they take such interest,
PS000004

2.

Motice

to Trustee,

written notice of any birth,

Until the Trustee

shall

receive

death or other event upon which Lli".

right

to payment from this Trust may depend,

incur

no liability for the disbursements or principal or

made

in

good

faith to persons whose

the Trustee

interest

may

shall
income

have

been

affected by that event,
3«

Beneficiaries

to teceive payments is, a minor,

entitled

the Trustee,
of

under Disability.

whether

When any

beneficiary

or in the judgment of

is mentally or physically incompetent, irrespective
so

legally

adjudicated,

the

Trustee,

in

his

discretion, may expend or apply any such payments for the benefit
of

such beneficiaries or,

make

such

in case of a minor

beneficiary, may

payments to the parents of the beneficiary ou to the

guardian of the beneficiary or to the person or persons with whom
such

beneficiary then resides.

Sums necessary for support

and

education may be paid directly to minor beneficiaries who, in the
judgment

of

discretion

the
to

Trustee,

render

it

have

attained

probable

that

sufficient
the

monies

age and
will

be

properly expended.
4.
beneficiary

Survivorship

of

Beneficiaries.

In

of the Trust created by this Trust

the

event

Agreement

any

shall

die

prior to the expiration of a period of thirty (30) days from

the

date

of the event entitling such beneficiary

to

benefits,

then for the purposes of such Trust it shall be deemed that
beneficiary
shall

did not survive such event and the Trust

be administered and distributed as though suck

had predeceased such event.

such

properties
bRneJSSI^^Si

5

«

this

Spendthrift Provision,

Trust

is

Each and every beneficiary under

hereby restrained from,

and are

without right, power or authority to sell,
pledge,

and

shall be

transfer, mortgage,

hypothecate, anticipate or in any other manner effect or

impair his, her,
interests,

or their beneficial or legal

claims, and

estates

in

rights,

and to the

titles,

income

and/or

principal of this Trust during the entire term, hereof; nor shall
the rights,

titles,

interests,

claims, or estates of any such

beneficiary

be subject to the rights or claims of creditors

nor

subject nor liable to the process of law or court*
6.

Designation

of Trustee.

It is understood and

agreed

that said PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK shall act as Trustee so long as UQ
is

living

and

competent.

In

incompetency of said PHILLIP D.
BIO

Cottonwood

Drive,

as

successor

event

SOUTHWICK.,

South Webet,

SOUTHWICK of 150 Jeremy Street,
•appointed

the

of

the

ROBERT S.

Utah 84405

by a

court

or

MXLllRR of:

and

Salt Lake City,

Co-Trustees

death

TRACT I,,

Utah,

shall b-

of

comprint

jurisdiction.
7.
Trustee

Trustee

Entitled

to Expenses and

Compensation.

shall be entitled to reasonable expenses and

compensation for services performed as Trustee,

Th"

reasonable

to be paid

ft"in

the Trust Estate,
8.

Definitions, The words "child11, "children" and "is.™-"

as used herein, shall include .legally adopted children.

The word

"issue" shall also include lineal descendants indefinitely.
The

words "Trustee or Trustees" are used interchnngnbiy and
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Trustees and a,,* successor « """""

„ orisinai ™

mGan

s t

IrUStS

" "

Trustee or Trustees.

I£

„H Is unenforceable,
Agreement Is un

this

vhsless *e carried into effect.
nevertheless o
^i
»•
the

» „ pI»«l=i'» » !

^

^

^

^

l

,

,

,

a c c e p tcd
a TrUSt

has been acc-t

and uniess otherwise, ^

Trustee in the State of « » .

under it shaU »° °°"°™°d
IH

,.

«THKSS «HERK0r.

soUWICK,

have

alld B l l

»
*

wn

,

executed

c

d

r,,hts

,. sol m>WI« « « B*"*" 1

•

^

this

by

dupUcite

u a

.

,

1989 .at
\2^

day of

Signed in the presence of:

DOTBTSOUTHWICK
Trustor

•iMfifHolmiwicK
Trustor

STATE OF UTAH

ss.

COUNTY O f ^ B ^
on the ^
be£ore

«

DON B.

«

I

i989_

or -

^

800THKICIL and B»WWA

personally

„„..-.

s o „ W I t t , Ulc

.!,.«..

of the within instrument,

who duly acknowledged to me that

they

executed the same.

ffpT/

CCV.T-S1CH

VI

.

suswin.PUK'.w J
—

x

;uLi^or.i

iT)}

^f^liTO^gJ^ft Expires:

VyV^O

KOTAEJ^ PUBLIC
Residing at

(}#

\cj L\tN,v^x t\

•
W

SCHEDULE "A"
ATTACHED TO THE SOUTHWICK FAMILY TRUST
Dated September 13, 1989

p

1.

^

11.93 Acres farm land located in Lehi, Utah County, Utah and
more particulary described as follows:
Commencing at a point 13 chains West and 4.54 chains South
of the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of Section
20, Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence East 5.75 chains; thence South 20.75
chains; thence West 5.75 chains; thence North 20.75 chains
to the point of beginning.
Together with six (6) shares of the Capital Stock
Spring Creek Irrigation Company.

.. 2;
<$&/

26 acres range land"located in Utah County,
particularly described as follows:

of

the

Utah and more

The North 26 acres of the East Half of the Southeast quarter
of Section 13, Township 5 South, Range 3 West of the Salt
Lake Base and Meridan.
^3.
^

80 acres range land located in Utah County,
particularly described as follows:

Utah

and more

NW1/4 of NW1/4 of Sec. 21, T. 4 S., R. 3 W., SLM; & SW1/4
of NW1/4 of Sec. 21, T. 4 S., R. 3 W., SLM. Area 80 acres.

&a

4.

Residence located at 911 North Tremont, Tremonton, Box Elder
County, Utah and more particularly described as follows:
Lot 16, Block 2, Amended Plat W, Tremonton Townsite Survey,
Box Elder County, Utah, according to the official plat
thereof.
Subject to any taxes or assessments now or hereafter levied
by any taxing unit.
SUBJECT TO a first mortgage to the First Security Bank of
Utah,. National Association for $14,65.0.00 dated October 3,
1961 in the office of the County Recorder of Box Elder
County, Utah October 9, 1961 in Book 153 of Mortgage Records
at Page 110, which mortgage the grantees agree to assume and
pay in accordance with the terms thereof.

^5.
ftpy

11.5 acres farm land and minor subdivision at Tremonton, Box
Elder County, Utah and more particularly described as
follows:

9

Beginning at a point on the North right of way line of a
frontage road 1045*3 feet East along the section line and
284.2 feet North of the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N./
R. 3 W,, SLB&M said point being on the grantor's East line,
and running North 57* 31f 30" West along said frontage road
line 530.9 feet; thence Northwesterly 235,6 feet along the
arc of a
539.96 foot radius curve to the right along said
line; thence North 32* 31' 30" West 38.0 feet along said
line; thence North 306.0 feet; thence North 1* 44' West
226.0 feet; thence North 87* 15f East 607.5 feet; thence
South 1* 44f East 1047.3 feet to the point of beginning,
containing 11.50 acres.
There are four (4) lots along the bottom of the above 11.50
acres more particularly described as follows:
LOT JL
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and 284.2 feet North
from the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., SLB&M
and running N 57*31,30rf W along said line 168.37 feet;
thence N 10*00 f00,f E / 3 8 1 . 9 3 feet'; thence 575*00'00" E 63.40
feet; thence S 1*44' E 450.00 feet to the point of
beginning, containing 1.00 acre, reserving an easement for a
drainage ditch 10 feet wide along the East side.
LOT 2
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31'30" W 168.37 feet from the
S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W. , SLB&M to the
true point of beginning and running N 57*31'30" W along said
line 134.10 feet; thence N 10*00'00" E 321.38 feet; thence S
84*17f00" E 124.26 feet; thence S 10*00'00" W 381.93 feet to
the point of beginning, containing 1.00 acre.
LOT 3.
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31'30"-W 302.47 feet from the
S.W. corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W,, SLB&M to the
true point of beginning and running N 57*31'30" W 125.00
feet; thence 40.16 feet along a curve to the right of 40.0
foot radius (Note:
Chord to said curve bears N 28*45'45" W
38.50 feet) thence North 213.00 feet; thence East 179.78
feet; thence S 10*00'00" W 321.38 feet to the point of
beginning, containing 0.99 acre.

10
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LOT A
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road
1045*3 feet East along the Section line and thence North
284,2 feet and thence N 57*31f 30" W 530.9 feet and thence N
56*201 W 72.0 feet from the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T.
11 N. , R. 3 W., SLB&M to the true point of beginning and
running 167.82 feet along a 539.96 foot radius curve to the
right; (Note:
Chord to said curve bears N 42*56*15" W
167.15 feet) thence N 32*31 f 30 u W 38.0 feet; thence North
107.75 feet; thence East 200.00 feet; thence South 231.52
feet; thence 90.76 feet along a 40.0 foot radius curve to
the right to the point of beginning, containing 1.00 acre.
n
fobs

6.

All that part beginning at a point on West right of way line
of County Road and the North right of way line of Utah-Idaho
Sugar Co, West Canal, which point is 1095 feet North, 33
feet West of Southeast Corner of Northeast Quarter of
Section 1, Township 11 North, Range 4 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, and running thence North 85* 25f West 188 feet
along the Canal right of way, thence North 460.9 feet,
thence North 86* 00 f East 188 feet to the County Road right
of way line, thence^South along said line to the point of
beginning. EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING:
Beginning at a point on the West right of way line of the
County Road and the North right of way line of the UtahIdaho Sugar Co. West Canal, which point is 1095 feet North,
33 feet West of the Southeast corner of the Northeast
Quarter of said Section 1, thence North 85* 25 f West 188
feet along the Canal right of way, thence North 257.9 feet,
thence North 86* 00 ! East 188 feet to the County Road right
of way line, thence South along said line to the point of
beginning.

(£$1•
k^

n^<^8.
v

/9.

Lot 47, Block 4, Beginning N. 0f and W. 8 f of the S.E. Corner,
thence W. 16' , thence N. 3 1/2 1 , thence E. 16', thence S.
3 l/2 ! to P.O.B.
2 spaces, incl. P.M. in the Provo City
Cemetery,
Lot 1, Block 12, in the Lehi City Cemetery.
Remaining interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract
between Don B. Southwick & Barbara P. Southwick, husband and
wife, as the Sellers, and Ed Muir & Lorraine Muir, his wife,
as the Buyers, dated March 1, 1979, marked Exhibit "A"
attached hereto.
Including a 1958 house trailer, Make Vendale,
Identification
Number V-2906Y102.
One used
electric range.
One 105,000 BTU gas furnace.
Escrow is
being held by Brigham Realty Inc. at 83 S. Main, Brigham
City, Utah.

11
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10.

1972 Ideal house trailer, S/N 1S3325

11.

1975 GMC 1-ton farm truck, Model C35C35f VIN YCY335Z501303

12.

1979 Luv pickup truck, VIN CRN1498285318

13.

1987 Century Buick Sedan automobile, 1G4AL51WXH6418162

14.

1972 two-horse trailer, Make - ROC, I.D. 710156HT

15.

John Deere Model "A" tractor, S/N 631171, approx. 45 years
old

16.

John Deere Model "A" tractor, S/N 574169, approx. 55 years
old

17.

24 shares of capital stock in the Lehi Spring Creek
Irrigation Company, Lehi, Utah. No. 30

18.

20.80 shares in Bear River Water Distribution Company,
Tremonton, Utah.

No. 3589

19.

85 shares in The Western States Machine Company.

20.

Guns:
300 Savage, S/N 558898
300 Savage, S/N 397006 w/t scope
308 Savage, S/N 1085641 w/t scope
Remington 12 gauge, Model 870, S/N 394415V
Marlin 22 rifle, Model 3 9-A
Sharps rifle, 50 calibre, S/N C23407 (1948)
Ruger pistol, 357 Mag., S/N 157-86346
S&W 22 calibre pistol, S/N 116056
S&W 357 Mag. calibre, Mod. 27-2, S/N N327396
20 gauge Ranger shotgun, S/N 105-21
22 rifle, Steven Model 56
410 gauge shotgun, Stevens Model 59A
12 gauge shotgun, Remington Model 10A
2 saddles made by Utahn Saddle Co., approx. 10 - 12 yrs. old
1 youth saddle
1 pack saddle

21.

No. 1754

2 each bridles, halters, ropes, chaps, and saddle bags
22.

Electric welder made by Forney and accessories

23.

Hand tools and wrenches

24.

1966 Metro truck, Model 1200, S/N 551211L006182

12
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1
1
1
1

buckskin mare, born 1971, Lady Bar Deck 71, #887509
black gelding, born 1975, Little Tomm Hawk, #1122182
bay mare
yearling buckskin gelding, born August 1988

All cattle with Rafter S on left hip thighmark are registered to Don B. Southwick
Bank Accounts:
Logan Savings & Loan:
Logan Savings & Loan:
Sandia Federal Savings
Sandia Federal Savings

#0303 60073915
#0203 60083711
& Loan: #064 7010568
& Loan: #061 3205050

13
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DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT NO.
,J?
CASE NO.
0&6t-Dfi3
OATEREC'D
IN EVIDENCE
CLERK

PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF B'OX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DON B- SOUTHWICK,

/

Plaintiff,

/

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs •

/

BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK,

/

Civil No.

/

Judge F. L. Gunnell

Defendant.

900000252DA

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on
the 18th-day of October, 1991, before the Honorable F. L.
Gunnell, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court,
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff not appearing
in person, nor
appearing
Vlahos,

in

and

with

his

attorney,

and

person

and

with

attorney,

Plaintiff's

her

attorney

having

the

Defendant
Pete iN.

withdrawn

as

attorney for the Plaintiff by written Motion 'and Order
and said Motion and Order was filed in open Court by the
Defendant's attorney, and it having been shown to the
Court that the Defendant was duly served with a copy of
the Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and wherein the

DECREE OF DIVORCE
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No.: 900000252DA
Defendant having answered same within the time allotted
by statute, and wherein the Stipulation of the parties
herein settling all of their property rights, alimony,
support, attorney fees, Court costs and other kindred
matters, and more than three (3) months having elapsed
from the date of the filing of the Complaint, and the
testimony of the Defendant having been heard in open
Court, and the Court having been fully informed in the
premises. and having made its Findings of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law, separately stated in writing, NOW
THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant, Barbara P. Southwick, is granted a Decree of
Divorce from the Plaintiff, Don B". Southwick, same to
become final upon the signing and entry.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
said Decree of Divorce shall incorporate herein all
matters of property rights, alimony, support, attorney
fees, Court costs and other kindred matters that are
contained in the Stipulation and Agreement of the parties
herein and same is set forth as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant shall direct

the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, who resides at 1150
South

660

West

DECREE OF DIVORCE

in

Tremonton,
2

Utah,

to

convey

the

SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No.: 900000252DA
necessary documents that will convey all of the property
presently in said trust to the Defendant, and that the
Defendant shall be the recipient and the sole beneficiary
under the Trust Agreement, and that the Plaintiff shall
have no further right or claim as a beneficiary in the
assets that have been placed in said Trust Agreement.
2.

That both parties jointly shall give written

notice to the Trustee, Phillip

D. Southwick, to do

whatever i*? necessarv to remove the Plaintiff- Don B.
Southwick, as a beneficiary under the Trust Agreement and
make Barbara P. Southwick the sole beneficiary of the
assets in the trust as her sole and separate property.
3.

That the Plaintiff specifically acknowledges

that the Defendant shall receive the following real" and
personal

property

that

is

presently

in

the

Trust

Agreement as the sole beneficiary, and does convey all of
his right, title and interest in and to the trust assets
and waives any claim as a beneficiary thereunder.
4. That said Trust Agreement includes the following
real property, to-wit:
(a)

11.93

acres of

land,

with

24

shares of

irrigation water located in Lehi, Utah.
(b)

80 acres of range land and 26 acres of range

land located in West Canyon, Utah County, Utah.
DECREE OF DIVORCE

3
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No.: 900000252DA
(c) Lots 3 and 4 being part of 11.5 acres of land
located

at

approximately

1100

South

4.96

hours of

Tremonton, Utah, including

850

West

in

irrigation

water.
(d)

The equity in the family home at 911 North

Tremont located in Tremonton, Utah, which has an equity
of $14,500.00, and the Plaintiff shall sell said home
without any commission and shall bring all mortgage
payments current to the date of sale, provided however
Defendant shall vacate the home within thirty (30) days
after the divorce is granted.
does not bring

a net of

That if the family home

$14,500.00 equity

for the

Defendant, the Plaintiff shall reimburse the Defendant
from his own personal assets all sums up to $14,500.00 so
that

the

Defendant

shall

receive

a net

equity

of

$14,500.00.
(e)
5.

Five lots in Lot 1 BlocK 12, Lehi Cemetery.
That Plaintiff shall assume the Nadine Peters7

note of $26,000.00 for the 9 1/2 acres, with 9.54 hours
of water, which is part of the 11.5 acres of land set
forth in item (c) hereinabove.
6.
is

That the Plaintiff shall convey and do whatever

legally

proper

and

necessary

to

convey

to

the

Defendant all other items of real and personal property
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No.: 900000252DA
as listed on the family Trust Agreement and all other
items presently owned by the trust by and between the two
(2) beneficiaries, Don B. Southwick
Southwick,

designated

respectively herein.

as

Plaintiff

and
and

Barbara

P.

Defendant

That the Plaintiff shall further

convey to the Defendant all items of real and personal
property, except as to those items he shall retain that
is not included in the trust and all items of real and

i
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property included in the trust to the Defendant as her
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1

sole and separate property.
7. That the Plaintiff shall receive as his sole and
separate property all of his clothes, small personal
items, such as toiletries, etc., and that the Plaintiff

1

is also awarded the 1980 Luv pickup truck as his sole and
separate property.

O

8. That the Plaintiff shall manage and take care of
the business building until the bank makes a decision as
to the disposition and said agreement is finalized and
further shall defend any lawsuit sought by the bank for
the foreclosure on said property.

That the Plaintiff

shall be entitled to receive the rental income during the
interim and shall also manage said business building
until that matter is disposed of, either by foreclosure
or sale, and the Plaintiff shall divide the rental income
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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from

the

building

equally

between

Plaintiff

and

Defendant, minus the reasonable expenses necessary in
maintaining

the building, which the Plaintiff

shall

furnish the Defendant a full accounting of,
9.

That the Plaintiff shall further pay to the

Defendant

the sum of

$145.00 per month

as and for

alimony, payable each month on or before the 15th day of
the month, commencing with the month of October. That in
addition, shall pay to the Defendant a proportionate
increase of his social security benefits as additional
alimony as he receives any additional payments in his
social security, and that the intent is to attempt to
equalize the income the parties are receiving for marital
assets, provided however the alimony shall terminate upon
the death of the Defendant or the Defendant's remarriage.
10.

That the Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant's

attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, the sum of $500.00 as and for
partial

attorney

fees

for

the

preparation

of

the

Stipulation, plus presenting the matter to the Court and
preparing the subsequent papers granting to the parties
the divorce.
11.

That the Defendant further shall bring current

and pay the property taxes on the 11.5 acres of land
located in Tremonton and on the land located in Utah
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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County, said taxes shall be for the years 1990 and 1991.
12. That the Plaintiff shall further provide to the
Defendant the necessary cash at the execution of the
Stipulation,

to

bring

current

the

delinquent

house

payments on the family home, which is located at 911
North Tremont in Tremonton, Utah.
13.

That the Defendant shall utilize the trust

properties to attempt to satisfy any deficiency that
might

arise

from

the

business

building,

which

is

presently being foreclosed upon, if the trust properties
are still in existence at the time of the final judgment
and shall utilize said assets if they are in existence
and

if

the

Defendant

has

control

over

said

trust

properties to attempt to satisfy any deficiency on the
pending foreclosure, provided however that if she does
not have any control over the assets in the trust, then
she would not be obligated to satisfy said foreclosure
judgment if one does occur.
14.

That each of the parties shall sign whatever

papers are legally necessary to effectively transfer the
interest that each is to receive in connection with this
agreement and upon failure to do so, the Stipulation and
Property Settlement Agreement shall serve as the full
agreement between the parties and shall serve as an
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effective and complete transfer of all assets that each
party is to receive under the terms of the Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement.
15.

That the Defendant shall assume and discharge

all other attorney fees she owes to her attorney, other
than

the

amount

that the Plaintiff

is

contributing

herein.
16.

That Plaintiff shall assume and discharge his

own attorney fees and costs.
MOV

y/

y

DATED this

,

day of Qotobor, 1991,

F. L. GUNNELL,
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Decree of Divorce was posted in the
United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to Don
B.

Southwick,

Plaintiff,

Tremonton, Utah

at

84337 on this

6th

North

p"

100

West,

day of October,

1991.

(/ra WaAw

Secretary
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DEFENDANT'SJEXHIBIT
EXHIBIT NO

CASENO

October 7, 1991

O^2/l0al

DATE REC'D
IN EVIDENCE .
[CLERK

Mr. Phillip D. Southvick
1050 South 660 West
Tremonton, UT 84337
Re:

Southwick vs. Southwick
My File: 400-V

Comes now the undersigned, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P.
Southwick, beneficiaries under that Trust Agreement dated
September 13, 1989 and which was signed in Tremonton, Utah, and
hereby direct said Trustee to convey and transfer all of the assets
located in said trust to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole
beneficiary under the terms of said Trust Agreement,
That the undersigned, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P.
Southwick, direct the Trustee to do whatever is legally necessary
to remove Don B. Southwick as a beneficiary under the terms of that
Trust Agreement and to designate Barbara P. Southwick as the sole
beneficiary under the terms of the Trust Agreement hereinabove
designated=
That both parties acknowledge they have a copy of the Trust
Agreement and that the direction being made to the Trustee is based
on the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement entered into
by and between Don B* Southwick as Plaintiff and Barbara P,
Southwick as Defendant in a pending divorce action, located in the
First Judicial District Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah,
bearing civil number 900000252DA.
That this letter is signed by both beneficiaries and directed
to the Trustee pursuant to their rights under the Trust Agreement.
DATED this

\ \

day of October, 1991.

%S^£l_£L
DON" B. SOUTHWICK,
Plaintiff & Beneficiary

'ZSXJCJL*
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! DEFENDANT!

jawainia • fr:

January 24, 1992

gg.
JJJUWL j .

Mr, Phillip D. Southwick
1050 South 660 West
Tremonton, UT 84337
Re:

Don B* Southwick and Barbara P. Southwick Trust

Dear Mr. Southwick:
Comes now the undersigned, TRACY L, SOUTHWICK, beneficiary under
that Trust Agreement dated September 13, 1989 which was signed in
Tremonton, Utah, and hereby renounces any claim he may have to
any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all
cash including
bank accounts, and all proceeds from life
insurance policies and further directs said Trustee to distribute
his share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK.
DATED this 3 f

day of January, 1992,

y

TRApY L. SOUTHWICK
Berieficiary

Approved and Accepted by

day of jm^JucA.

the undersigned

as Trustee this

. 1992.

r

\J6 D.
PHILLJT
D. SOUTHWICK

Trustee
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